volume	20,	no.	15 may	2020 Austerity and Illusion Craig French & Ian Phillips University of Nottingham Johns Hopkins University © 2020 Craig	French	&	Ian	Phillips This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020015/> M any contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are	incapable	of	accounting	for	illusions.	Various	sophisticated	proposals	have	been	ventured	to	meet	this	charge.	Here,	we take	a	different	approach	and	dispute	whether	the	naïve	realist	owes any	distinctive	account	of	illusion.	To	this	end,	we	begin	with	a	simple,	naïve	account	of	veridical	perception.	We	then	examine	the	case that this	account	cannot	be	extended to illusions.	By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument,	we show that it depends critically	on	the	contention	that	perceptual	experience	is	diaphanous,	or more	minimally	and	precisely,	that	there	can	be	no	difference	in	phenomenal	properties	between	two	experiences	without	a	difference	in the	scenes	presented	in	those	experiences.	Finding	no	good	reason	to accept	this	claim,	we	develop	and	defend	a	simple,	naïve	account	of both	veridical	perception	and	illusion,	here	dubbed	Simple,	Austere Naïve	Realism. 1. Naïve Realism Naïve	realism	is	the	view	that	the	conscious	character	of	experience in	genuine	cases	of	perception	is	constituted,	at	least	in	part,	by	nonrepresentational	perceptual	relations	between	subjects	and	aspects	of the	mind-independent	world.	On	this	view,	aspects	of	mind-independent reality are presented in experience, and thereby constitutively shape the contours	of consciousness (Martin 1997, 2004, Fish 2009, Kalderon	2015). Prescinding from	any	epistemic connotations, call the relation	at the	heart	of	the	naïve	realist	account	conscious acquaintance	(Campbell 2002,	Fish	2009,	Brewer	2011,	Soteriou	2013).	And	call	those	entities with which we are acquainted the presented elements of experience (Martin	1998).	We'll	talk	mainly	of	objects	and	their	features,	but	presented	elements	evidently	include	entities	of	other	sorts	(e.g.	events).1 The	naïve	realist	makes	two	key	claims	about	such	elements.	First,	that they	include	mind-independent	entities.	Second,	that	being	literal	constituents	of	experience,	such	elements	must	actually	exist	for	a	subject 1. See	Johnston	(2011:	174ff)	for	an	initial	catalogue. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) Principle	(Robinson	1994:	32)		is	rejected	by	both	naïve	realists	and their	contemporary	intentionalist	rivals. To	understand	(A)'s	appeal,	we	need	to	look	instead	to	more	recent literature.	To	this	end,	consider	two	examples	of illusions	as	usually conceived by philosophers: perceptual experiences wherein a perceived	object	appears	other	than	it	is.2 Car Case: S	sees	a	red	car	under	streetlights;	it	looks	orange	to	her	(Fish	2009:	150). Window Case: S	sees	a	rectangular	window	on	the	fourth floor	of	a	building;	from	street	level,	it	looks	square	to	her (ibid:	159). Before	considering	these	examples,	let	us	ask	what	a	simple,	naïve	realist	account	of	ordinary	veridical	perception	must	minimally	involve. Suppose	S	sees	a	red	car	and	it	looks	red	to	her.	Here	the	naïve	realist can	simply	appeal	to	the	car	and	its	redness	to	account	for	the	experience.	More	generally, in such	ordinary cases, the	naïve realist	has no	need	to	appeal to	presented	elements	other than	ordinary,	mindindependent	objects	(e.g.	cars,	windows)	and	their	basic	visible	qualities	(e.g.	colors,	shapes,	and	sizes).	Doubtless,	natural	scenes	contain many interrelated such	elements.	And these	elements	are	quite	heterogeneous	(think	of	flashes,	mists,	and	shadows).	However,	the	claim here	is	not	that	presented	elements	are	all	of	a	piece	("moderate-sized specimens	of	dry	goods"),	but	rather	that	those	required	to	account	for ordinary	cases	of	perception	are	confined	to	familiar	elements	of	our environments	and	their	familiar	visible	features. Suppose	this	is	right.	Then	the	most	minimal	naïve	realist	account of	illusion holds	that	only	the	very	same	elements	required	to	account for ordinary veridical cases are needed: familiar	mind-independent objects and their basic visible properties.3 In particular, no appeal 2. Not	all illusions	fit this	mould	(Johnston	2006,	and	Batty	and	Macpherson 2016). 3. A	model	for	us	here	is	Martin's	"parsimonious	view	of	looks"	which	"proposes to	be	in	a	state	of	that	fundamental	kind	(Martin	2006).	The	objects	of experience	in	cases	of	genuine	perception	thus	contrast	with	the	objects	of	thought,	imagination,	and	memory.	More	will	be	said.	First,	we consider	why	illusions	are	so	widely	thought	to	thwart	naïve	realism. 2. The Problem of Illusion The	problem	of	illusion	for	naïve	realism	runs	as	follows: (A)	Naïve	realism	fails	for	(certain)	illusory	experiences. (B)	The	same	account	must	be	given	of	all	perceptual	experiences	as	of	illusory	experiences. (C)	Naïve	realism	fails	for	all	perceptual	experiences. (A) is	an	instance	of	what	Snowdon	(1992:	68)	calls the	"Base	Case", where	a	negative	claim	is	made	about	a	certain	sort	of	case		here, (certain) illusions. (B) is an instance of what Snowdon calls the "spreading	step",	where the	Base	Case	claim is	generalized.	Here	we focus	just	on	(A).	What	argument	can	be	given	for	(A)? One	obvious	candidate	is	the	first	part	of	the	traditional	argument from	illusion: i. In an illusory experience, it seems to one that something	has	a	quality, F,	which	the	ordinary	object	supposedly	being	perceived	does	not	actually	have. ii.	When	it	seems	to	one	that	something	has	a	quality, F, then there is something of which one is aware which does	have	this	quality. iii.	Since	the	ordinary	object	in	question	is,	by	hypothesis, not-F,	then	it	follows	that	in	cases	of	illusory	experience, one	is	not	aware	of	the	object	after	all.	(Crane	and	French 2016) This	argument	will	not	help	us	here.	Not	only	is	it	invalid	(French	and Walters 2018), but its second premise	 the so-called Phenomenal craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) Proponents	and	opponents	of	naïve	realism	alike	either	quickly	reject	or	simply	fail	to	consider	this	approach.	Proponents	of	naïve	realism	typically	formulate	some	alternative	account	of illusions	instead (e.g. Fish	2009,	Kalderon	2011,	Genone	2014). In so	doing, they implicitly	or	explicitly	concur	with	their	opponents	that	Simple,	Austere Naïve	Realism	is	untenable	(e.g.	Foster	2000,	Smith	2010,	Block	2010). In	the	next	section,	we	reconstruct	an	explicit	version	of	the	underlying	argument	against	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	By	doing	so,	we expose	how it	depends	critically	on the	assumption that	perceptual experience	is	diaphanous,	or	more	minimally	and	precisely,	that	there can	be	no	difference in	phenomenal	properties	between	two	experiences	without	a	difference	in	the	scenes	presented	in	those	experiences.	Call	this	the	Difference	Principle.	In	section	four,	we	examine	how the	Difference	Principle	has	forced	naïve	realists	to	elaborate	accounts of	illusion	which	reject	one	or	both	elements	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve Realism.	In	section	five,	we	explain	how	rejecting	the	Difference	Principle	frees	the	naïve	realist	to	embrace	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism. Finally,	in	section	six,	we	reply	to	three	arguments	for	the	Difference Principle. 3. Exposing the Difference Principle A.	D.	Smith	presents	the	core	objection	to	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	as	follows: Consider	...	a	case	where	a	green	square	looks	yellow	to me, though it does look square.	...	This square's shape furnishes the phenomenal character of the illusory perception	... in the respect	of	being	as	of	a square.	What, however,	about	the	apparent	yellowness?	It,	clearly,	must be accounted for by something other than the green square	being	a	constituent	of the	experience,	since this is the	case	when	a	green	square	veridically looks	green to	me.	Some	extra,	"bad"	factor,	over	and	above	the	green square's	being	a	constituent,	must,	therefore,	be	attributed is required to special appearance or perspectival-properties, nor to sense-data	or	intentional	aspects	of	experience.	Note	that	we	do	not suppose	that	an	exhaustive	specification	of	simple	elements	and	basic visible	aspects	can	be	given	in	abstract	terms.	Rather,	we	take	it	to	be common	knowledge	that	certain	features	can	be	presented	in	ordinary veridical	cases	of	perception,	and	deny	that	illusions	require	us	to	recognize	any	further	elements. Call	these	two	claims,	respectively,	Simplicity and	Austerity. Simplicity: The character-constituting presented elements	of	ordinary	veridical	experience	are	just	ordinary visible features	of the	mind-independent	world: the	objects	we	ordinarily	take	ourselves	to	see	and	their	basic visible	properties. Austerity:	Illusions	do	not	differ	from	veridical	cases	(as understood in Simplicity), neither in relational nature, nor in the kind of character-constituting presented elements	to	which	they	are	relations. Together, these claims articulate Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. They entail	that	the	same	(and	only	the	same)	simple	presented	elements of	mind-independent	reality	which	constitutively	shape	the	contours of	conscious	experience	in	veridical	perception	also	do	so	in	cases	of illusion. The	most	straightforward	application	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	to	the	examples	above	holds	that	in	Car	Case,	S is	acquainted with the	car	and its redness,	and that these	presented	elements	are constitutive	of character;	and that in	Window	Case,	S is	acquainted with the	window	and its rectangularity,	and that these	presented	elements	are	constitutive	of	character		no	other	novel	or	additional presented	elements	are	needed.	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	thus declines	to	offer	any	distinctive	theory	of	illusion. that	we	identify	the	looks	of	objects	with	their	basic	visible	properties,	including	their	colors	and	shapes"	(2010:	161). craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) In rejecting	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism,	Smith and	Fish thus assume	that	if	two	experiences	have	different	phenomenal	properties, they	must have different character-constituting presented elements. This	critical	assumption is	an	aspect	of	a thesis	which	Martin labels "Diaphaneity",	the	thesis	that	"sameness	and	difference	of	phenomenal properties	just	are	sameness	and	difference	in	[character-constituting] presented	elements"	(Martin	1998:	175).4 Diaphaneity	entails	two	conditional	principles: Difference Principle:	Necessarily,	if	two	experiences	differ	in	phenomenal	character,	then	they	differ	in	characterconstituting	presented	elements. Sameness Principle:	Necessarily,	if	two	experiences	are alike in phenomenal character, then they are alike in character-constituting	presented	elements. The	Difference Principle	will be our focus in	what follows. In addition	to	Smith	and	Fish,	many	other	critics	of	naïve	realism	endorse	the principle.	Foster	assumes	it	when	he	argues	that	the	mere	existence of "cases of non-veridical perception immediately establishes that [naïve	realism],	as	a	general	theory	of	perception,	is	mistaken"	on	the grounds	that	naïve	realism	guarantees	"full	veridicality"	and	"leaves	no room	for	cases	in	which	...	how	things	sensibly	appear	...	is	at	variance with	the	character	of	the	perceived	item"	(2000:	64).	Likewise,	Block's argument against naïve realism "based on the fact that [in special experimental	contexts]	...	there	can	be	more than	one	phenomenal character of experience of the same instantiated properties, even if nothing	about	the	environment	or	the	non-mental	relations	between the	subject	and	the	environment	differs" (2010:	49−50) lapses if the 4. Martin cites Price 1932. Theorists (e.g. Block 2010) sometimes talk about "Moorean Diaphaneity" following Moore 1953. Diaphaneity should not be conflated	with	transparency.	As	we	discuss	in	§6,	perceptual	experience	may be	transparent	(in	that	introspection	of	such	experience	inevitably	involves attention	to	presented	elements)	without	being	diaphanous.	As	a	result,	there is	no	reason	that	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	should	not	partly	be	motivated	by	appeal	to	transparency	(Martin	2002). to	this	partially	illusory	state	to	account	for	the	illusorily appearing	colour:	something	that	is	absent	in	the	case	of completely veridical perception, where the constituent object	itself	does	all	the	work.	(2010:	388–389) Smith imagines two cases: a veridical perception	of a green square which	looks	green	to	him;	and	an	illusory	perception	of	a	green	square which	looks	yellow	to	him.	Can	an	account	of	the	illusory	case	be	given	in	terms	of	a	green	square	being	a	constituent	of	the	experience,	as Austerity	would	have	it?	Smith	thinks	"clearly"	not,	because	that	is	the account	of	the	veridical	case.	Presumably,	his	thought	is	that	if	the	illusory	case	shared	its	presented	elements	with	the	veridical	case,	then the	two	cases	would	have	the	same	color	character,	which	evidently they	do	not. Fish	articulates	the	core	objection	even	more	explicitly.	He	again compares	two	cases:	a	veridical	experience	of	a	red	car	looking	red	to S;	and	an	illusory	experience	of	the	same	red	car	looking	orange	to	S (Car	Case	above).	Fish	then	poses	a	dilemma	for	the	naïve	realist	which divides	over	whether	they	treat	both	cases	as	involving	acquaintance with	the	car's	being	red.	If	they	do,	Fish	claims	that	both	will	have	to	be alike	in	color	phenomenology,	when	evidently	they	are	not.	If	they	do not, then they	appear to	have	no	alternative	acquaintance-with-concrete-facts	(i.e.	Fish-style	naïve	realist)	story	to	tell.	"Either	way,"	Fish concludes,	"there	looks	to	be	no	way	of	supplying	the	illusory	experience	with	an	alternative	phenomenal	property	with	which	to	account for	the	difference	in	what	it	is	like	to	have	the	illusory	experience	of the	relevant	feature"	(2009:	150–151). Fish seizes the second	horn of the dilemma, developing a	more sophisticated acquaintance-with-concrete-facts story for the illusory case	(see	below).	However,	our	present	interest	is	why	Fish	thinks	that Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	fails.	What	we	are	given	is	this:	If	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	is	true,	then	the	veridical	and	illusory	car experiences	must	have	the	same	color	phenomenal	properties.	Since they	don't,	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	is	false. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) ordinary	visible	features	of	the	mind-independent	world: the	objects	we	ordinarily	take	ourselves	to	see	and	their basic	visible	properties. (7)	In	C1,	the	relevant	character-constituting	presented	elements	are	simply	O	and	its	F-ness. (8)	It's	not	the	case	that,	in	C2,	the	relevant	character-constituting	presented	elements	are	simply	O	and	its	F-ness. (9)	Austerity:	Illusions	do	not	differ	from	veridical	cases (as	understood	in	Simplicity),	neither	in	relational	nature nor in the kind of character-constituting presented elements	to	which	they	are	relations. (10) The only relevant character-constituting presented elements	of	the	same	kind	as	those	required	to	account for	ordinary	cases	of	veridical	perception	which	are	present	in	C2	are	O and	its	F-ness. (11) In	C2, the relevant character-constituting presented elements	are	simply	O	and	its	F-ness. CONTRADICTION To	apply	the	argument	to	Car	Case,	we	simply	take	C1	as	daylight	and C2	as	streetlight,	and	stipulate	that	no	car-substitute	is	available	to	step in	as	a	presented	element	and	that	the	car	is	no	other	color	than	red. The	Difference	Argument	exposes	a	fundamental	tension	between Simplicity,	Austerity, and the	Difference	Principle.	As such, it represents	a	significant	step	towards	(A)	above		the	claim	that	naïve	realism	fails	for	(certain)	illusions.	The	argument	does	not	establish	(A).	It does	show	that,	given	the	Difference	Principle,	Simple,	Austere	Naïve Realism	fails	and	that the	naïve	realist	owes	some	other	positive	account	of	illusions. In	the	next	section,	we	briefly	review	the	positive	accounts	developed	by	three	naïve	realists:	Kalderon	(2011),	Fish	(2009),	and	Genone Difference	Principle	is	rejected.	Pautz's	(2017)	critique	that	naïve	realism	is	unable	to	accommodate	phenomenal	differences	arising	from differing neural response dispositions also assumes that naïve realist	phenomenal character is	grounded in "nothing	but" (24) the	presented	scene.	This	implies	the	Difference	Principle.	Finally,	Brogaard's (2018)	suggestion	that	cases	which	show	that	the	"phenomenology	of experience	is	not	exhausted	by	the	external	object	and	its	perceptible properties	instances"	(9)	count	against	naïve	realism	also	assumes	the Difference	Principle. With	all	this	in	mind,	we	now	formulate	our	target	argument	against Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism. The Difference Argument Take	an	object	O,	a	perceiver	S,	and	a	pair	of	perceptual contexts	C1	and	C2.	Suppose	that	O instantiates	sensible quality	F,	and	consider	G,	where	F	and	G	are	incompatible. (1)	Let	C1	be	an	ordinary	case	of	veridical	perception in which	S	experiences	O	as	F. (2)	Let	C2	be	a	case	of	illusion	in	which	S	experiences	O as	G. (3)	So	there	is	a	difference	in	phenomenal	properties	between	the	experience	of	O	in	C1	and	the	experience	of	O in	C2. (4) The	Difference Principle: Necessarily, if two experiences	differ	in	phenomenal	character,	then	they	differ	in character-constituting	presented	elements. (5)	So	there is	a	difference in	character-constituting	presented	elements	between	the	experience	of	O in	C1	and the	experience	of	O	in	C2. (6) Simplicity: The character-constituting presented elements of ordinary veridical experience are just craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) aspect	of	the	car's	redness	is	not	selected,	instead	its	red look	is.	Thus, prevailing	perceptual	conditions	make	different	looks	available. Second,	Fish.	Fish	(2009)	thinks	of	perspective	and	perceptual	conditions	not	merely	as	selecting which	features	shape	character,	but	as partly	determining	what is there to be selected.7 For instance, in	Car Case, Fish denies that S is acquainted	with the fact of the car's being red. Instead, S is acquainted with the car's exhibiting a certain (presumably	orange	or	orange-looking)	shade,	where this shade is	a relational	property	determined	partly	by	the	car's	color	but	partly	by relevant	illumination	conditions	(158).8	Since	the	car	has	this	property only relative to the current perceptual conditions, those conditions play	a	determinative availability role. Finally,	Genone	also	endorses	a	determinative	role	for	perceptual conditions. For	Genone, appearances,	whilst "entirely	mind-independent"	(2014:	357)	properties,	are	distinct	from	the	basic	visible	properties	of	objects	such	as	their	sizes,	shapes,	and	colors.	Rather,	appearances are relational "properties an	object has in a given	perceptual context"	(366,	fn.	34),	possessed	"in	virtue	of	their	intrinsic	properties and	various	environmental	conditions"	(357).	Thus, in	Car	Case,	the subject	is	aware	of	the	car's	appearance	(not	its	color)	where	this	is	a relational	property jointly	determined	by its	actual	color	and	the	sodium	street-light	context.	The	subject	may	mistakenly	judge	that	the car	is	orange	insofar	as	this	appearance	is	indiscriminable	for	the	perceiver	from	the	appearance	of	an	orange	car	in	daylight	(362).9 Despite their differences, Kalderon, Fish, and Genone all understand perspective and perceptual conditions to play an availability role,	allowing	cases	of	illusion	to	be	handled	in	conformity	with	the 7. Here,	we	focus	just	on	Fish's	account	of	physical	(as	opposed	to	cognitive	and optical)	illusions	(2009:	148–149). 8. Despite	ordinary	usage,	"shades"	in	Fish's	technical	idiolect	are	not	colors	or basic	visible	qualities. 9. It	is	unclear	whether	on	Genone's	view	colors	are	ever	seen,	or	merely	known (see	2014:	366,	fn.	34). (2014).	Despite their various	differences,	we show	how	all three accounts	reject	Austerity,	and	with	it,	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism. 4. Anti-Austerity To	account	for	the	illusions	under	discussion,	the	naïve	realist	will	naturally	appeal	to	facts	about	the	perceiver's	perspective	and	perceptual conditions.	Thus,	plausibly, in	Window	Case,	S sees the rectangular window	as	square	because she is looking at it from a certain point of view, and in	Car	Case,	S sees	the	red	car	as	orange	because it is illuminated by streetlights. More	generally,	differences	in	character	between	the	kinds of veridical and illusory pairs targeted by the	Difference	Argument arise	because	of	differences	in	perspective	and	perceptual	conditions. This	Appeal to Perspective doesn't	tell	us	how	facts	about	perspective and	conditions	explain	phenomenal	differences.	Yet	almost	without exception,	they	are	taken	to	play	an	availability role:	They	affect	which presented elements are available to shape phenomenal character.5 This	respects	the	Difference	Principle.	However,	because	there	are	no differences	in	the	ordinary	objects	and	basic	visible	qualities	presented	across	our	veridical	and	illusory	pairs,	this	way	of	exploiting	the	Appeal to Perspective	means	introducing	additional	non-simple	elements in	accounting for illusions,	and	so the rejection	of	Austerity. If such additional	elements	are	also	held	to	play	a	role	in	veridical	perceptual experiences,	Simplicity,	too,	will	be	rejected. To	illustrate,	consider	the	accounts	of	three	contemporary	naïve	realists.6	First,	Kalderon.	Kalderon	(2011)	argues	that	in	cases	such	as	Car Case,	whilst	the	car's	redness	is	present	in	experience,	so	is	its	orange look.	For	Kalderon,	this	look	is	a	sensible	aspect	of	the	car's	objective color (Kalderon 2008). In different perceptual conditions, different looks	are	available	to	shape	character.	Under	streetlights,	the	car's	orange look is	selected	and	so	shapes	character.	In	natural	light,	that	same 5. Cf.	Beck	on	"selectionism"	(2019:	610−611). 6. We	discuss	Campbell	and	Brewer's	accounts	in	the	next	section. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) ways those	presented	elements	are	presented.12	To	embrace	such	variation	is	to	reject	the	Difference	Principle. We	can	combine	this	idea	with	the	Appeal to Perspective:	Experiences	can	differ	in	character	because	of	differences	in	facts	about	perspective and perceptual conditions. Instead of understanding this exclusively	in	terms	of	availability,	however,	the	naïve	realist	can	propose that	facts	about	perspective	can	make	a	difference	to	the	way	in	which presented	elements	are	presented.	If	so,	experiences	can	differ	in	character	despite	not	differing	in	presented	elements. Take	Car	Case. In	daylight, the	car looks red to	S;	under	sodium streetlights,	orange;	and	perhaps,	at	night,	grey.	Despite	this,	nothing other	than	the	car	and	its	redness	need	be	presented	to	S.13	For	there	is no	unique	way	of	perceiving	these	elements.	The	car	and	its	redness can	shape	experiential	character	in	many	different	ways.	There	is	no need	to	appeal	to	different	aspects of	redness	to	account	for	the	variation	(as	in	Kalderon),	or	to	different	relational	"shades"	(as	in	Fish),	or to	different	relational	appearances	(as	in	Genone).	Certainly,	there	is no	need	for	represented	colors	or	colored	sense-data. Likewise,	take	Window	Case.	Looked	at	from	one	angle,	the	window	looks	rectangular	to	S;	from	another	angle,	square;	and	perhaps, through	distorting lenses,	oval.	Despite this,	nothing	other than the window	and	its	rectangularity	need	be	presented	to	S.	For	these	elements	can	shape	character	in	many	different	ways	according	to	the	differing	circumstances	of	perception.	Again,	there	is	no	need	to	appeal to different perspectival shapes or relational appearances, let alone represented	shapes	or	shaped	sense-data. In	this	way,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	reject	the	Difference	Principle,	and	hence the	Difference	Argument.	Against it, they insist that there need not be just one	way of seeing a given scene. 12. A similar thought can be found in Soteriou (2013: 25), Logue (2012: 222), and	Beck	(2019).	Neither	Martin	nor	any	of	these	authors	appeal	to	ways	of presentation	in	addressing	arguments	from	illusion	as	we	do	here.	Soteriou briefly	mentions	this	option	elsewhere	(2016:	188–191). 13. At	least	as	regards	car	and	color.	Features	of	the	surrounding	perceived	circumstances,	such	as	the	ambient	light,	will	doubtless	vary	across	most	cases. Difference Principle.10 The price is Austerity. For differences in perspective	do	not	change	which	ordinary	objects	and	qualities	are	available across veridical and illusory pairs. Thus, additional presented elements	must	be	introduced:	for	Kalderon,	looks of	objects	or	colors, conceived	of as	distinct from	basic visible	qualities	or amalgams	of such;11	for	Fish,	special	relational	shades	and	perspectival	shapes;	and for Genone, relational, context-specific appearances. The common consequence	is	the	rejection	of	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism. In the next section, we offer a different response to the Difference	Argument	which	is	fully	consistent	with	Simple,	Austere	Naïve Realism. 5. Denying the Difference Principle The	Difference	Principle	leads	both	naïve	realists	and	their	critics	to reject	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	Yet	it	is	largely	an	unargued	assumption. It is	certainly	not,	as	opponents	of	naïve	realism	often	assume (e.g. Block 2010: 29), built into the very idea that	mind-independent	entities	are	character-constituting	constituents	of	experience. We	now	explain	how	denying	the	Difference	Principle	is	perfectly	coherent for the	naïve realist.	We	first	present	our	proposal,	and then develop	it	by	responding	to	a	series	of	challenges. In	voicing	skepticism	about	Diaphaneity,	Martin	asks	rhetorically: "Why cannot the	ways in	which things are presented in experience make	a	difference	to	what	the	experience	is	like	in	addition	to	what	is perceived?"	(1998:	175).	The	idea	is	that	even	holding	fixed	characterconstituting	presented	elements,	experiences	might	still	differ	in	the 10. Fish	explicitly	endorses the	Difference	Principle	(2009:	57, fn.	4).	Kalderon and	Genone	do	not	(though	see	discussion	of	Kalderon	in	§6),	but	their	accounts	of	illusion conform	to	it. 11. Kalderon's	departure	from	Austerity	is	minimal	insofar	as	his	looks	are	aspects of	basic	visible	qualities.	However,	they	are	not	simply	identifiable	with	such qualities.	Kalderon	rejects	both	Austerity	and	Simplicity	since	such	looks	also figure	in	ordinary	veridical	perceptions	on	his	view. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) 5.2 Isn't our view simply a three-place or third-relatum account such as offered by Campbell and Brewer? The	answer	depends	on	how	exactly	such	views	should	be	understood. Consider first Campbell (2009, also Campbell and Cassam 2014). Campbell	notes	that	you	can	have	different	experiences	of	a	complex shape (2009: 655), for example by viewing it from	different angles. He	thus	rejects the	view	that "the full	characterization	of	your	experience	of	shape	is	given	by	saying	that	you	bear	the	generic	relation of	consciousness to	a	particular three-dimensional	shape"	(ibid.). Instead,	and	like	us,	Campbell	proposes	that	shapes	can	be	experienced in	different	ways.	Distinctively,	however,	Campbell	unpacks	this	idea by analyzing experience as a three-place relation between subjects, presented	elements,	and	a	third,	perceptual	"standpoint"	relatum.	This standpoint	comprises	multifarious	factors,	firstly	the	sense	modality	in question,	and	then	corresponding	factors	such	as	the	subject's	relative orientation	and	location. On one interpretation,	Campbell's picture is highly congenial to Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism.	On	this	interpretation,	the	third-relatum serves to	deny that there is a function (unique	mapping) from subjects and presented elements to phenomenal characters. This is equivalent to denying the Difference Principle. Campbell goes beyond the	mere	denial of functionality in articulating various factors which	comprise	the	standpoint.	However,	insofar	as	he	simply	aims	to indicate	some	of	the	factors	which	affect	phenomenal	character	overand-above	variation	in	presented	elements,	this	is	again	congenial	to our	approach.	We	see	no reason to	endorse (nor	attribute to	Campbell)	stronger	commitments, for instance, that	we	can	enumerate	all possible	standpoint	factors,	or	that	there	exists	any systematic relation between	phenomenal	characters	and	standpoints.	On	this	interpretation,	our	key	contribution	is	to	extend	Campbell's	account	of	veridical perception	to	illusions	about	which	Campbell	is	silent. Campbell's account is often understood in a quite different	way, however.	On	this	understanding,	the	third-relatum	plays	an	availability	role,	selecting	or	determining	which	worldly	features	are	presented Elements	can	be	presented,	and	so	shape	character,	in	many	different ways, due to variation in	perspectival factors.	We	now	develop this core	claim	via	a	series	of	challenges. 5.1 Doesn't appealing to ways of perceiving go well beyond Simplicity and Austerity? Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism	has	a	modest,	negative	ambition:	to	eschew	any	distinctive	treatment	of	illusions,	and	maintain	that	a	simple account	of	veridical	perception	is	already	entirely	adequate.	By	introducing	ways	of	perceiving	into	our	account	of	illusions,	have	we	abandoned	this	ambition?	We	have	not.	Appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving does	not	force	the	naïve	realist	to	say	that	illusions	differ	from	veridical cases	in	their	relational	nature,	or	in	the	kind	of	presented	elements they	involve.	Furthermore,	we	are	not	appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving specifically to account for illusions.	Veridical	perceptions	equally	involve ways	of	perceiving.	When	S	veridically	perceives	the	red	car,	the	car and its redness	are	not	merely	perceptually	presented to	S.	They	are perceptually	presented	visually,	from	such-and-such	a	point	of	view,	in natural	daylight,	and	so	forth.	Thus,	appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving	in illusions	involves	no	distinctive	new	"machinery".	It	conforms	entirely with	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist's	modest	negative	ambition. Because	ways	of	perceiving	are	part	of	both	veridical	and	illusory cases,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	also	easily	accommodate ordinary,	non-illusory	(constancy-preserving)	cases	of intra-individual	variation in	appearance.	Similarly, they	can	accommodate	Block's claim	that	due	to	normal	variation	of	the	visual	system	(e.g.	peak	cone sensitivity and	macular pigmentation), "any [color] chip is likely to look	different to	different	people,	especially those	who	differ in sex, race	or	age"	(1999:	44;	cf.	Pautz	2017	and	Brogaard	2018:	87−92).	Block exploits	this	fact	to	argue	against	representationalism	and	in	favor	of qualia.	We	take	such	data	rather	to	show	that	structural	differences	in the	visual	system	can	lead	to	different	ways	of	veridically	perceiving identical presented elements, allowing for inter-individual phenomenological	variation	despite	sameness	in	presented	elements. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) interpretation, these	properties are	what	Brewer calls looks.	So construed,	Brewer's	view	can	be	considered	a	version	of	Simple,	Austere Naïve	Realism.15 Our	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	approach	thus	aligns	well	with existing	three-place	naïve	realist	views	on a certain minimal interpretation of them.	Indeed,	minimally	interpreted,	we	do	not	consider	there to be any substantive difference between treating perception as a single	three-place	relation	holding	between	subjects,	standpoints,	and presented	elements,	or	as	a	multiply	determinable	two-place	relation holding between subjects and presented elements. On both treatments, there is no function from presented elements to conscious perceptual characters.	And	on	neither view	do standpoints or	ways number	amongst	the	presented	elements	of	perception.	Nonetheless, given the	evident	confusion	and	obscurity	surrounding the interpretation	of three-place	views,	we	avoid framing	our	own	view	in	such terms. 5.3 Isn't our view just a form of adverbialism? The	adverbialist	holds	that	"having	a	visual	experience	is	a	matter	of sensing	in	a	certain	manner"	(Tye	1984:	195–196).	This	provides	them with	a	simple	account	of illusions.	Of	Car	Case, for instance,	the	adverbialist	will	hold	that	even	though	there	is	nothing	orange	perceptually	presented	to	S, S	"senses	orangely"		that	is,	senses	in	an	orange manner	or	way	 and this is	what	accounts for the	character	of	S's experience. Our	approach	differs	from	the	adverbialist	approach	in	two	important	respects.	First,	the	adverbialist	denies	that	S	senses	the car	or	the car's redness,	and	senses	it orangely.	The	adverbialist	holds	merely	that 15. This	interpretation	fits	better	with	Brewer's	treatment	of	his	third-relatum	as	a constitutive	aspect	of	perceptual	experience	(2011:	100,	fn.	5).	If	the	third-relatum	played	an	availability	role,	a	constitutive	treatment	would	be	puzzling. The	relatum	would	be	constitutive	of	a	certain	relational	property,	but	unless constitution	were	transitive,	this	would	not	suffice	to	make	it	constitutive	of experience	itself. In	contrast, if the	third-relatum	marks	an	ineliminable	additional	dimension	of	variation in the	phenomenal	nature	of	acquaintance, then	it	makes	sense	to	conceive	of	it	constitutively. from	occasion	to	occasion.	Thus,	Pautz	(citing	Campbell	and	Cassam 2014:	28)	claims	that	Campbell's	standpoint	relatum	"is	just	a	matter of	which	external	states	in	the	scene	you	are	acquainted	with"	(2017: 24).	Similarly,	Genone	offers	his	Difference	Principle-conforming	account (discussed above) as a development of Campbell's approach (2014:	351),	construing	Campbell's	standpoint	as	partially	determining which	relational	appearance	properties	are	perceptually	available.	We reject	such	three-place	accounts	given	their	conformity	to	the	Difference	Principle. Brewer	also	proposes	a	three-place	analysis	of	perceptual	acquaintance	(e.g.	2011:	96),	which	he	does	extend	to	illusions.	To	illustrate	his approach,	recall	Car	Case.	On	Brewer's	picture,	relevant	perspectival factors,	here	saliently	the	street-lighting,	constitute	a	third-relatum	of the	perceptual relation in	addition to	subject	and	presented	objects. Relative to this third-relatum, Brewer holds that the car is visually similar	to	a	paradigm	orange	object.	This	grounds	the	car's	possession of	an	orange	look.	This	look	is	not	a	basic	visible	quality,	but	rather	a special	-	albeit perfectly objective	-	feature that the car has in relation to the street-lighting. Again, there are different	ways of understanding	this	proposal.	It	is	natural	to	think	that	we	can	be	presented with	the	looks	of	things	("Did	you	see	the	look	on	his	face?")	and	so to	number	Brewer's	looks	alongside	ordinary	objects	and	their	basic visible	features	as	presented	elements	available	to	shape	experiential character.	To	do	so	is	to	assign	a	determinative	availability	role	to	the third-relatum	in	the	manner	of	Genone's	approach	discussed	above. There is,	however,	an	alternative	understanding	of	Brewer's	view on	which looks	are	not themselves	presented	elements.14	Rather, as on	our	view,	presented	elements	are	presented	in	particular	ways	depending	on the circumstances	of perception.	Relative to some such set of circumstances, a given element	has the objective property of being such as to present itself perceptually in a given	way.	On this 14. Indeed,	in	his	early	writings	on	the	Object	View	(e.g.	2011:	6),	presented	elements	seem	restricted	entirely	to	physical	objects.	However,	Brewer	(2018b: 20)	now	explicitly	admits	basic	visible	features. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) Contra	(1),	we	deny	that	ways	of	perceiving	are	specifiable	in	terms of	perceptible	qualities.	Contra	(2),	we	deny	that	ways	of	perceiving make	a	wholly independent	and separable contribution to	phenomenology.	Ways	of	perceiving	in	our	sense	cannot	account	for	the	phenomenology	of	hallucination	in	the	way	that	Beck	takes	them	to.17	The way	of	perceiving in	Car	Case,	associated	with	perceiving	under sodium	streetlights,	cannot	be lifted	out	of that	context to	account for a	hallucination	as	of	something	orange.	It	is	not	a	matter	of	"perceiving	orangely"	or	"being	appeared	to	in	an	orangeish	way".	Insofar	as	it helps	to	explain	why	things	look	orange	to	S,	this	is	not independent of	the	presentation	of	redness	to	S	in	the	specific	context	in	question. It	does	not itself bring	orangeness	into	the	mix	in	the	way	that	"perceiving	orangely"	or	"being	appeared	to in	orangeish	way"	does. Indeed, perceiving	in	a	way	associated	with	sodium	streetlights	has	no	intrinsic	connection	to	orangeness	at	all:	One	could	perceive	a	blue	car	and it	look	green	to	one	under	such	illumination	conditions. 5.4 Isn't our view just a version of the Theory of Appearing? Again,	no,	and for	similar	reasons.	Consider	S's	veridical	experience of	the	red	car	as	red.	According	to	the	Theory	of	Appearing,	the	color character	of	this	experience	is	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	a	relation between	S	and	the	car:	the	relation	of	"appearing	red"	(Langsam	1997: 36).	But	what	about	Car	Case?	Well	here,	presumably,	the	proponent of	the	Theory	of	Appearing	will	hold	that	S	bears	a	different	relation to	the	car,	namely	that	of	"appearing	orange".	Phenomenal	character is thus understood in terms of ways of being related to	mind-independent	objects,	appearing	red	being	one,	appearing	orange	another. 17. In	holding	that	"ways	of	presentation"	are	shared	across	veridical	perceptions and	causally	matching	hallucinations,	Beck	attempts	to	reconcile	naïve	realism	with	a	common	factor	approach	to	perceptual	experience.	We	deny	that hallucinations	can	be	given	any	such	positive	characterization	(Martin	2004). We also deny	Beck's claim that	ways of presentation are completely determined by "neuro-computational properties" (625). Neuro-computational factors	may	figure	amongst	the	perspectival	factors	which	generate	different ways	of	perceiving.	But they	do	not	exhaust	such factors,	nor	exhaustively determine	such	ways. S	senses	in	an	orange way.	Nothing	is presented	to	S which	is	constitutive	of	the	character	of	S's	experience	(Tye	1984:	196).	Rather,	the	adverbialist replaces character-constituting	presented	elements	with	adverbially-specified	ways	of	sensing.	In	appealing	to	ways	of	perceiving, we	are	absolutely	not	suggesting	that	they	replace character-constituting	presented	elements.	In	Car	Case,	if	we	stripped	away	the	presented	elements,	no	experience	specifiable	simply	in	terms	of	the	way	of perceiving	in	question	will	be	left.	Ways	of	perceiving,	as	we	conceive of	them,	lack	such	independence	from	presented	elements.	They	are not	the	adverbialist's	intransitive	ways	of	sensing,	but	transitive	ways of	being acquainted with character-constituting presented elements.	There	is no	such	thing	as	merely	perceiving	under	sodium	streetlights	(French 2014:	411).16 Second, we reject the characterization of ways of perceiving in terms	of	the	perceptible	qualities	which	specify	the	character	of	the	experience	in	question.	We	deny,	for	instance,	that	there	is	such	a	thing as	an	orange	or	rectangular	way	of	perceiving,	or	a	way	of	perceiving orangely	or	rectangularly.	Rather,	we	specify	ways	of	perceiving	indirectly	by	reference to	perspectival factors, including	external factors such	as	the	illumination	conditions,	and	internal factors	such	as	the perceptual	modality	involved	(and	even	structural	facts	about	perceptual	systems). In	this	way,	we	diverge	from	Beck's	(2019)	conception	of	"ways	of presentation".	Unlike	the	adverbialist,	Beck	maintains	that	mind-independent	presented	elements are	constitutive	of	character	(at	least	in veridical	experience).	However,	in	other	respects,	his	account	is	similar to the	adverbialist's.	Beck thinks: (1) that	ways	are specifiable in terms	of	relevant	perceptible	qualities,	and	(2)	that	ways	make	an	entirely	independent	contribution	to	character.	He	thus	holds	that	"you can	be	appeared	to	in	a	roundish	way	in	both	a	perception	and	in	a hallucination"	(627). 16. None	of	this	precludes	absences	counting	amongst	the	presented	elements of	experience	(Sorensen	2008).	To	perceive	an	absence	is	not	merely	to	perceive	(Phillips	2013). craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) not	conform	to	its	manner	of	presentation"	(2011:	173).	Here,	Johnston treats	the	ASE's	manner	of	presentation	in	terms	of	a	perceptible	feature	(shape): Think	of	an	innocent	looking	at	the	"bent"	pencil.	What makes	one	of	the	ASEs	he	is	enjoying	illusory	is	this:	the item	that is the	object	of	that	ASE,	e.g., the	pencil, fails to	match	the	mode	of	presentation	that	is	constitutive	of the	ASE,	the	three-dimensional	curved-shape.	(2011:	195) The	case	is	an	illusion	because	this	shape	mischaracterizes	the	ASE's object:	"Token	ASEs	are	non-veridical	if	and	only	if	their	manners	of presentation	mischaracterize their objects; they are veridical if and only if their	manners	of	presentation	correctly	characterize their	objects"	(2014:	129). In	contrast,	as	emphasized	above,	our	ways	of	perceiving	are	not specifiable	in	terms	of	perceptible	features.	Nor	do	they	characterize (or	mischaracterize)	the	objects	of	experience.	These	points	are	related.	Our	ways	of	perceiving	are	not	characteristics.	The	way	of	perceiving	involved	in	Car	Case	is	perceiving	under sodium streetlights. There	is no	question	of	it	(figuring	in	experience	as)	characterizing	or	mischaracterizing	the	perceived	car,	nor	of	the	car	conforming	to	or	matching the	way	we	perceive	it. At	this juncture,	we	have	said	a	great	deal	about	ways	of	perceiving.	Yet	we	have	left	unaddressed	an	important	question.	In	Car	Case, orangeness isn't instantiated in the	environment that	S	perceives.	Yet the	car	looks	orange to	S.	So: 5.5 How does orangeness get into the picture? Why does the car look orange to S? Orange	enters	the	adverbialist	picture	via	the	mode	of	sensing.	It	enters	Beck's	version	of	naïve	realism	via	his	independently	specifiable ways of presentation. It enters via the relation of appearing orange according to the Theory of Appearing. And it enters into the	manner of presentation	on Johnston's view.	But how	does our view	get These	ways	are	not	detachable	from	character-constituting	presented elements as the adverbialist's	ways are.	They are relations	between subjects	and	the	mind-independent	objects	they	perceive.	Because	of this,	they	also	differ	from	Beck's	ways;	they	are	not	present	in	cases	of hallucination	(Langsam	1997:	37−41).18 Nonetheless,	such	relations	of	appearing	are specifiable	in	terms	of perceptible	features,	and	so	differ	from	our	ways	of	perceiving.	In	Car Case,	the	proponent	of	the	Theory	of	Appearing	will	appeal	to	a	specific	way	of	being	related	to	the	car:	the	relation	of	appearing	orange. We	too	appeal	to	a	specific	way	of	being	related	to	the	car,	but	this	is not	the	relation	of	appearing	orange, it is	a	matter	of	perceiving	the car	in	such-and-such	circumstances,	i.e.	under sodium streetlights,	etc. To repeat,	perceiving	the	car	in	such	a	way	has	no	intrinsic	connection	to orangeness	at	all:	One	could	perceive	a	blue	car	and	it	look	green	to one	under	such	illumination	conditions. Finally,	our	view	differs	from	the	view	proposed	recently	by	Johnston (2011, 2014),	which	he explicitly aligns	with the	Theory of	Appearing	(2011:	172).	Johnston	aims	to	give	an	account	of	what	he	calls "attentive sensory episodes" (ASEs), such as	S's looking at a red car. Such	an	episode	not	only	involves	S	being	related	to	an	object	of	perception,	but	what	Johnston	calls	a	"manner	of	presentation".	According to Johnston,	we	perceive the	objects	of	ASEs	under	manners	of presentation.	And	episodes	which	involve	the	same	object	can	differ thanks to	a	difference in	manner	of	presentation. Johnston	even	exploits	such	manners	of	presentation	in	discussing	illusions.	One	might think,	then,	that	our	view	is	a	variant	of	Johnston's. However, there is a critical difference. In line	with adverbialists, Beck,	and	the	Theory	of	Appearing,	Johnston	understands	manners	of presentation	in	terms	of	perceptible	features.	Furthermore,	to	provide an account of illusions, Johnston	holds that an object "may	or	may 18. As	a	result,	Langsam	adopts	a	disjunctivist	account	of	hallucinations.	Alston (1999:	191–192)	develops	his	theory	of	appearing	differently	by	claiming	that (certain)	hallucinations	are	relations	of	appearing	between	subjects	and	mental images. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) to	orangeness.	Consequently,	the	car's	orange	look	can	be	identified with	its	red	color	(cf.	Martin	2010:	215).20 Although	orangeness is	now in the	picture, it remains to	explain where	the	salient	subjective	similarity	arises	from.	Why,	under	sodium streetlights,	does	the	red	color	of	the	car	strike	S	as	being	more	like	being	orange	than	anything	else?	Of	course,	our	account	will	point	to	the way	in	which	the	car	and	its	redness	are	perceived.	But	the	explanatory	demand	is	to	go	beyond	this	structural	characterization.	Why	does being	bathed	in	sodium	streetlight	mean	that	redness	is	perceived	in such	a	way	that	it	strikes	S	as	more	like	orange	than	its	actual	color? Here	(and	despite	disagreeing	with	aspects	of	his	metaphysics	of looks),	Brewer's	discussion	is	valuable.	According	to	Brewer, visually	relevant	similarities	are	similarities	by	the	lights of	visual	processing	of	various	kinds.	Objects	have	visually	relevant	similarities	when	they	share	sufficiently	many common	properties	amongst	those	that	have	a	significant involvement in the	various	processes	underlying	vision. Thus,	and	very	crudely,	visually	relevant	similarities	are identities in	such things	as the	way in	which light is reflected	and	transmitted	from	the	objects	in	question,	and the	way in	which stimuli are	handled	by the	visual system,	given	its	evolutionary	history	and	our	shared	training	during	development.	(2011:	103) The	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	hold	that	under	sodium	streetlights,	the	red	color	of	the	car	is	similar	in	some	of	the	above	respects to	a	paradigmatic instance	of	orangeness in	natural	daylight.	Specifically, suppose (purely for the purpose of illustration) that the car's 20.	A	consequence	of	this	parsimonious	view	is	that	the	red	car	has	an	orange look	even in	natural	daylight.	Objects	only	change their	appearance	when they	change	their	basic	visible	qualities.	This	may	seem	like	an	unattractive consequence	since	it	means	that	"the	car	looks	orange"	is	true	of	the	car	as it	is	in	natural	daylight.	Martin	argues	that	the	proponent	of	Parsimony	can meet	this	objection	by	explaining	why	"the	car	looks	orange"	is	not	assertible in	the	context	of	natural	daylight,	even	if	it	is	true	(218–222,	discussing	the bent	stick). orangeness	into	the	picture,	given	that	we	explicitly	deny	that	ways	of perceiving	amount	to	"sensing	orangely"	or	similar? To	address	this	question,	we	draw	on	Martin's	(2010)	discussion	of looks	(especially	his	discussion	of	the	bent	stick,	195–222).	Following Martin,	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	can	say	that,	under	sodium streetlights,	the	car	has	a	feature	-	a	look	-	which	is	relevantly	similar to	the	paradigm	look	of	an	orange	thing. What	are	looks?	If	looks	are	special	properties,	not	identifiable	with basic	visible	qualities,	then	though	we	haven't	yet	said	that	they	are presented	elements,	we	are veering away from the	modesty	of Simplicity	and	Austerity.	To	avoid	this,	we	claim	that	the	feature	of	the	car which	is	relevantly	similar	to	the	paradigm	look	of	an	orange	thing	just is	the	car's	actual	color,	its	redness.	Moreover,	we	claim	that	the	paradigm	look	of	an	orange	thing	simply	is	its	orangeness.	Thus,	the	car looks	orange	because	of	a	similarity	between	two	basic	visible	properties, viz. redness and	orangeness, a similarity	made salient in the relevant	conditions.	More	generally,	our	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist appeals	to	Martin's	Parsimonious account	of	looks,	on	which	looks	are simply	basic	visible	qualities:	"size,	shape,	colour,	visible	texture,	spatial	arrangement	of	parts"	(2010:	207)		or	constructions	out	of	these.19 For	this	view	to	pass	muster,	the	car's	red	color	must	be relevantly similar to	orangeness.	But in	what	way is redness	similar to	orangeness?	The	answer	is	that	in	the	circumstances	of	Car	Case,	the	subject looking	at	the	red	car	will	be	inclined	to	find	the	actual	color	of	the car	before	her	as	more	like	orangeness	than	anything	else.	Thus,	the psychological	impact	that	the	red	color	of	the	car	has	on	the	subject	in Car	Case	is	similar	to	the	psychological	impact	that	the	orange	color of	a	car	has	on	a	subject	who	sees	it	in	natural	daylight		a	paradigmatic circumstance for encountering orangeness.	On such a subjective	measure	of	similarity,	the	red	color	of	the	car	is	relevantly	similar 19. For	ease	of	exposition,	we	focus	just	on	the	car's	color,	but	in	general,	the	look of	an	object	which is relevantly	similar to the	paradigm look	of	an	orange object	may	involve	a	more	complex	construction	out	of	its	basic	visible	properties.	Pointillist	paintings	arguably	provide	a	good	example	of	such	a	case. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) similarities	and	differences	with	paradigm	cases	of	perception.	To	understand	why	these	subjective	similarities	and	differences	obtain,	we will in	part	need	to	look	to	empirical	work	on	visual	processing	-	at psychological	and	neurophysiological	levels	of	explanation. There	remains	one	final	challenge	to	confront. 1.6 Don't we risk introducing a common factor into explanations of phenomenology which conflicts with the core commitments of naïve realism? We	have	explained	why the red car looks	orange	by	appealing to	a similarity in	how redness	perceived	one	way strikes	us and	orangeness	perceived	another	strikes	us.	We	accounted	for	this	similarity	by appealing	to	the	similarity	of	proximal	input	to	our	visual	system.	But if	how	things	strike	us is	explicable in terms	of	something	common across	such	cases,	then	there	would	seem	to	be	pressure	to	positively characterize the	phenomenological situation	common	to	both	cases. For familiar reasons,	we are resistant to doing so (see	Martin 2004, 2006). The	pressure	towards	a	common	factor	is	resistible.	To	see	this,	we need	to	remember	that	subjective	similarities	can	obtain	without	qualitative	identity.	Thus,	an	orange	car	perceived	in	daylight	and	a	red	car perceived	in	streetlight	may	elicit	similar	experiential	states	without those	states	being	qualitatively	identical.	In	particular,	the	naïve	realist will	insist	that	the	states	are	qualitatively	distinct	in	having	their	characters partially grounded in orangeness in one case and redness in the	other.	Nonetheless,	they	are	similar	in	that	both	provoke	matching classificatory	inclinations. Consider	a	specific	version	of	Car	Case	where	the	proximal	input is, by stipulation, exactly the same	under sodium illumination as it is	in	some	non-illusory	daylight	case.	Given	naturalistic	assumptions, such	a	case	will	involve	a	perceptual	state	which	is	not	knowably	not a	case	of	orange	car	seeing.	We	will	thus	have	an	experience	as	of	an orange	car	(given	the	treatment	of	experience	in	Martin	2004).	However,	there	is	no	pressure	here	to	characterize	the	experience	purely negatively (as	Martin argues	we	must characterize a corresponding redness is	a	matter	of its	having	a	certain	surface	reflectance	profile. And	suppose	that	the	product	of	the	interaction	of	sodium	streetlight with	this	profile	which	is	incident	at	the	retina	is	closely	matched	with the	product	of	the	interaction	of	natural	daylight	with	the	surface	reflectance	profile	of	a	paradigm	orange	object.	Because	of	this	match	in light	incident	at	the	retina,	the	redness	of	the	car	in	Car	Case	is	liable to	strike	S	as	more	like	orangeness	than	anything	else. This	is	not	to	retract	what	we've	said	about	the	car's	orange	look. The	car's	orange look is simply its red	color (contra	Brewer).	This is relevantly	similar	to	orangeness	given	a	subjective	measure	of	similarity.	What	Brewer	offers	us,	however, is	a	deeper	explanation	of this subjective	similarity:	of	why	the	car's	redness	strikes	S	as	like	orangeness	when	perceived	under	sodium	streetlights.	In	general,	these	explanations	will	be	piecemeal	and	highly	contingent	on	relevant	vision science.	Why	subjects	are inclined to	classify stimuli	as they	are,	as bent	despite	being	straight,	as	moving	when	still,	or	as	concave	when convex,	are	matters	for	empirical	investigation	and,	in	many	cases,	ongoing	controversy.	Our	aim	is	not to	provide	such	explanations,	but only	to	show	how	such	explanations	are	quite	consistent	with	Simple, Austere	Naïve	Realism. We	can	pull	these	ideas	together	in	responding	to	the	reader	who asks	exactly	what	ways	of	perceiving	are	and	how	they	contribute	to phenomenal	character.	In	the	first	instance,	to	talk	of	ways	is	simply	to insist that there is	no function from	presented	elements to	phenomenal	characters.	This	is	essentially	a	structural	claim:	We	can	see	one and	the	same	scene	in	different	ways.	Nothing	more	informative	can be	said	about	ways	at	this	level	of	generality.	There	is	no	general	answer	to	how	scenes	and	circumstances	of	perception	interact	to	settle the	way	the	scene	is	seen,	and	so	fix	character.	In	particular	cases	of perception,	however,	we	can	fruitfully	ask:	Why	does	the	way	in	which the subject perceives the scene affect the phenomenal character of their	experience	as	it	does?	Our	answer	here	will	advert	to	how	the various	elements	of the	scene	strike	the	subject,	given	the	way	they are	perceived	-	and in	particular, to the	visually relevant subjective craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) We	can	offer	a	parallel	defense	of	the	Difference	Principle:	Introspection	of	your	perceptual	experiences seems to reveal	only	aspects	of what	you	experience,	further	aspects	of	the	scenes,	as	presented.	Why? The	answer	is	that	your	perceptual	experiences	have	no	introspectible features over and above their character-constituting presented elements. So the phenomenal character of such experiences is	wholly constituted	by	their	presented	elements.22 Tye's	introspective	claim	is	notoriously	controversial.	Nonetheless, in	the	present	context,	a	more	concessive	reply	is	available.	For	the	naïve	realist	can	agree	with	the	following	transparency	thesis:	Introspection of your perceptual experience inevitably involves attention to presented	elements.	After	all,	the	naïve	realist	can	happily	allow	that all	aspects	of	experience	are	scene-involving,	being	relations	between subjects	and	presented	elements	(Soteriou	2013:	88).	What	the	naïve realist	who	rejects	the	Difference	Principle	must	deny	is	that	aspects of	a	scene	can	only	be	perceived	in	one	way.	However,	it is	obscure how	transparency	considerations	could	establish	such	a	strong	claim. How	could	the	fact	that	introspective	reflection	inevitably	lands	upon aspects	of	the	presented	scene	establish	that	such	aspects	could	only shape	conscious	character	in	one	way? Debates	about	transparency	and	intentionalism	standardly	pit	the pure	intentionalist	against	the	believer	in	qualia	or	mental	paint.	Their dispute	is	said	to	represent	the	"greatest	chasm	in	the	philosophy	of mind"	(Block	1996:	19).	Here,	"mental	paint"	refers	to	intrinsic	properties	of	experiences in	virtue	of	which	they	represent	externalia.	The dispute	between	transparency	and	qualia	theorists	concerns	whether we	are	aware	of	any	such	features.	The	naïve	realist	conceives	of	perception	as	an	essentially	relational	phenomenon.	As	a	result,	they	will eschew	mental	paint	so	conceived	(Campbell	2009:	659).	Nonetheless, there	is	a	weaker,	more	general	notion	of	mental	paint	which	qualia theorists	also	employ	and	in	relation	to	which	they	occupy	common ground	with	the	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve	realist.	According 22. Strictly,	this	last	claim	is	stronger	than	our	minimal,	modal	formulation	of	the Difference	Principle. hallucination). For	we can	positively characterize the state in terms of	the	red	car	seen	in	a	certain	(sodium	street-lit)	way.	It	is	true	that we	have	the	same	experience	across	these	veridical	and	illusory	cases. But	as	is	familiar	from	disjunctivist	approaches	to	hallucination,	such experiences	do	not	constitute	a	fundamental	experiential	kind.	Rather, the	experience	in	one	case	will	be	fundamentally	one	of	seeing	a	red car	in	sodium	light,	the	experience	in	the	other	case	will	be	fundamentally	one	of	seeing	an	orange	car	in	daylight.21 6. Arguments for the Difference Principle Rejecting	the	Difference	Principle	is	a	coherent	and	attractive	strategy for	the	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist.	However,	it	remains	to	consider whether	anything	might	be said in favor	of it. In the	absence	of explicit	arguments	in	the	literature,	we	offer	two	arguments	inspired	by standard	defenses	of	pure	intentionalism:	the	view	that	phenomenal character	supervenes	on	(or	is	determined	by,	or	even	identical	with) representational	content.	We	also	identify	a	third	epistemic	argument for	a	principle	close	to	the	Difference	Principle.	These	arguments	may explain	why	some	naïve	realists	cleave	to	the	principle.	Their	failure frees	them	to	reject	it. The	most	familiar	consideration	adduced	in	support	of	pure	intentionalism	is	the	so-called	transparency	of	experience.	Thus,	Tye: [I]ntrospection	of	your	perceptual	experiences	seems	to reveal only aspects of what you experience, further aspects	of	the	scenes,	as	represented.	Why?	The	answer,	I suggest, is that	your	perceptual	experiences	have	no introspectible	features	over	and	above	those	implicated	in their	intentional	contents.	So	the	phenomenal	character of such experiences ... is identical with, or contained within,	their	intentional	contents.	(1995:	136) 21. We	do	not	mean	here	to	take	a	stand	on	whether	experience	presents	highlevel	categories	such	as	carhood.	A	reader	disinclined	towards	this	view	can think	of	the	fundamental	kind	as	seeing	a	red	car-sized	and	shaped	object	in sodium	light,	and	seeing	an	orange	car-sized	and	shaped	object	in	daylight. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) experience	without	a	difference	in	presented elements.	The	Difference Principle	follows. Byrne focuses	on	defending	his	argument's	first	claim, taking	his second claim to	be	obvious.	Thus, "Premise	B"	of	Byrne's argument runs: Assume	that	a	subject	enjoys	an	experience	e	that	ends	at t	and	then	experience	e*,	and	that	after t	the	subject	notices	a	change	in	phenomenal	character,	solely	on	the	basis	of	her	current	experience	e*	and	the	(perfect)	memory produced	by	her	past	experience	e.	Then	the	way	things seem to the subject	when	she	enjoys e	differs from the way	things	seem	when	she	enjoys	e*.	That	is,	the	content of	e	differs	from	the	content	of	e*.	(210) Here,	in	the	final	step	(as	elsewhere),	Byrne	simply	equates	the	way things	seem	when	a	subject	is	enjoying	her	experience	with	the	content	of	that	experience.	Opponents	of	pure	intentionalism	will	likely balk. Byrne's "Premise B" has a natural naïve realist analogue: Simply replace "content" by "character-constituting presented elements" in the	final	sentence.	Analogously,	this	argument	simply	assumes	that	if there	is	a	difference	between	two	experiences	in	the	ways	things	seem to their subjects, there	must be a difference in presented elements. Here, the	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve realist	will	balk, for to assume	this	is	not	to	argue	for	the	Difference	Principle,	but	bluntly	to assert	it. Lastly,	we	consider	an	explicit	defense	by	a	naïve	realist	of	a	principle	close	to	the	Difference	Principle.	Kalderon	(2008)	considers	a	case of	color	perception	in	which	a	normal	perceiver,	Norm,	sees	a	garment (say	some	red	trousers)	in	two	different	lighting	conditions.	Because of	metamerism,	in	the	fluorescent	storelight,	Norm	cannot	tell	which of	two	reds	the	trousers	are.	Bringing	them	into	daylight,	he	comes	to know	which.	(Whilst	not	a	case	of illusion, the	structure	of the	case parallels	one	in	which	the	store illumination	does	elicit	an	illusion.) to	this	weaker	notion,	to	believe	in	mental	paint	is	simply	to	believe that	"representationally	identical	experiences	might	be	phenomenally different" (Block 1996: 548).	The	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve realist	will	agree	that	there	is	mental	paint	in	this	minimal	sense.	As they	will	put	the	thought:	Experiences	can	be	phenomenally	different despite	sharing	precisely	the	same	presented	elements. Far from	being	confounded	by transparency	considerations, then, the	Difference	Principle-denying	naïve	realist	offers	a	happy	compromise	between	those	on	either	side	of	Block's	great	chasm.	For	on	the one	hand,	our	naïve	realist	can	agree	with	Tye	that	transparency	tells against	our	being	aware	of	intrinsic	(i.e.	non-relational)	features	of	our experience.	On	the	other	hand,	our	naïve	realist	can	agree	with	Block that there	are	differences in	phenomenal	character	which	do	not involve	differences	in	the	presented	scene.23 Byrne (2001) offers a second well-known argument for pure intentionalism.	Byrne's	argument	distils	to	two	simple	claims:	first,	that there	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	phenomenal	character	of	someone's experience	without a change in the	way the	world seems to them; second,	that	there	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	way	the	world	seems	to someone	in	experience	without	a	difference	in	representational	content.24	It	follows	that	there	can	be	no	changes	in	phenomenal	character without	corresponding	changes	in	representational	content.	Again,	we can	convert this	argument into	an	argument for the	Difference	Principle.	The	first	claim	remains	unaltered.	The	second	claim	becomes: There	cannot	be	a	change	in	the	way	the	world	seems	to	someone	in 23.	Much ink has been spilt debating putative counter-examples to pure intentionalism (e.g. Peacocke 1983, Tye 1995: 155–159). Some intentionalist responses to such	putative counter-examples	parallel	ways in	which	naïve realists	such	as	Fish	and	Genone	have	sought	to	block	arguments	from	illusion	(e.g.	Tye	2002:	453	on	the	representation	of	viewpoint-relative	size).	The possibility	of	making	such	moves	in	either	case	makes	the	counter-example strategy	appear	unpromising.	Nonetheless,	we	are	sympathetic	to	many	such counter-examples.	They	reveal	how	strong	and	unnatural	an	assumption	the Difference	Principle	is. 24. See	further	Thau	2002:	30–33,	and	also	Siegel	2012:	chpt.	2. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) Kalderon's argument closely resembles a very widely held view about	perception	and	consciousness,	given	voice	by	Byrne	in	the	following	passage. Accounts	of	phenomenal	character	divide	on	a	fault	line between presentationalists and sensationalists. Presentationalists think that phenomenal character is solely a matter of the subject's awareness (or better, ostensible awareness)	of	his	environment.	...	According to	presentationalists, th[e]	presented segment	of reality	fixes the phenomenal character of [one's] experience. ... Sensationalists	deny	that	this	is	all	there	is	to	phenomenal	character.	They	usually	base	their	case	on	alleged	examples where	the	presented	segment	of	reality	remains	constant while	phenomenal	character	changes.	... If sensationalism is true, then the phenomenal character	of	an	experience	can	to	some	extent	float	free	from the segment of reality the experience (ostensibly) presents,	and	so	its	relevance	to	the	epistemic	status	of	beliefs about	that	segment	is	entirely	unclear.	This	is	why	Smithies,	a	prominent	defender	of the	epistemic relevance	of phenomenal	character,	writes	that: It is because perceptual experience has the phenomenal	character	of	confronting	one	with	objects and	properties	in	the	world	around	me	that	it	justifies	forming	beliefs	about	those	objects	and	properties.	(2014:	103).	(Byrne	2016:	956−957;	emphasis in	original) relation to that content" (301).	Without commitment to there being confidence	relations,	our	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realist	will	agree	with	Munton here	that	the	same	scene	can	be	experienced	in	different	ways,	some	placing us	in	stronger	epistemic	positions	than	others.	That	said,	Morrison's	development	of	a	closely	related	view	on	which	"some	veridical	experiences	involve relations	to	objects	that	are	absent	(or	even	non-existent)"	(2016:	44)	is	plainly	inimical	to	naïve	realism. Unusually,	Kalderon	explicitly	countenances	the	idea	of	rejecting	the Difference	Principle:	"Perhaps	the	way	something	is	presented	in	experience,	as	well	as	what's	presented,	can	make	for	a	phenomenal	difference" (2008: 955).	Moreover, he	denies that	we can conclusively establish	"the	general	claim	that	a	difference	in	the	phenomenal	character	of	experience	suffices	for	a	difference	in	what	is	present	in	that experience"	(956;	see	also	2011b:	241).	Nonetheless,	he	insists	that	we should	not	understand	the	case	of	Norm	in	terms	of	variation	in	the way	one	and	the	same	color is	presented. Instead,	we	must	think	of Norm	as seeing	different aspects	of the color in the two	conditions (as	discussed	above,	and	in	conformity	with	the	Difference	Principle). Why? [T]he phenomenal difference between Norm's colour experience in the shop	and in	daylight	must	be	due to presentational	difference	if	it	is	to	have	the	positive	epistemic significance it	must have if on the	basis of these phenomenally	distinct	experiences	Norm	could	come	to know	which	colour	he	is	perceiving.	(2008:	956) What is obscure here is why only presentational differences could yield "positive epistemic significance". Suppose, pace Kalderon, that the	phenomenal	difference	between	storelight	and	daylight	is	a	matter of	the	way	Norm	perceives	the	garment's	color	as	a	result	of	the	prevailing illumination	conditions.	Why	should	this	mean	that the	epistemic	difference	between	Norm's	situations	in	and	out	of	the	store	cannot	be	captured?	Why	can't	it	be	that	in	some	illumination	conditions (perceiving	the	garment	one	way),	Norm	is	able	to	know	which	color it	is,	whereas	in	others,	he	is	not?	Perhaps	some	ways	of	perceiving	are epistemically	superior	to	others,	enabling	us	to	know	more	precisely what	is	presented	to	us	(cf.	Brewer	2018:	§5).25 25. Compare recent discussions of perceptual confidence.	Munton (2016), for example,	considers	a	pair	of	cases	in	which	a	subject	is	confronted	with	the same	scene	in	and	out	of	fog.	She	argues	that	the	subject's	differential	epistemic	standing	derives	from	a	difference	in	experience	best	explained	by	the hypothesis	that	"visual	states	comprise	not	only	a	content,	but	a	confidence craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) -	(2018). "Perceptual	Experience	and	Empirical	Reason".	Analytic Philosophy	59(1):	1–18. -	(2018b).	"Reply	to	de	Bruijn".	Analytic Philosophy 59(1):	20–22. Brogaard,	Berit	(2018).	Seeing and Saying: The Language of Perception and the Representational View of Experience.	New	York:	OUP. Byrne, Alex (2001). "Intentionalism Defended". The Philosophical Review	110(2):	199–240. -	(2016). "The Epistemic Significance of Experience". Philosophical Studies	173(4):	947–967. Campbell,	John	(2002).	Reference and Consciousness.	Oxford:	OUP. -	(2009).	"Consciousness	and	Reference".	The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven	Walter	(eds).	Oxford:	OUP,	648–662. Campbell, John	and	Cassam,	Quassim	(2014).	Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?	Oxford:	OUP. Crane,	Tim	and	French,	Craig	(2016).	"The	Problem	of	Perception".	The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.	E.	Zalta	(ed).	Spring	2016. Fish, William (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Oxford: OUP. Foster,	John	(2000).	The Nature of Perception.	Oxford:	OUP. French,	Craig (2014). "Naïve	Realist	Perspectives	on	Seeing	Blurrily". Ratio	27(4):	393–413. French,	Craig	and	Walters,	Lee	(2018).	"The	Invalidity	of	the	Argument from	Illusion".	American Philosophical Quarterly	55(4):	357–364. Genone, James (2014). "Appearance and Illusion". Mind 123(490): 339–376. Johnston,	Mark	(2006).	"Better	than	Mere	Knowledge?	The	Function of	Sensory	Awareness".	Perceptual Experience.	Tamar	Szabo	Gendler and	John	Hawthorne	(eds).	Oxford:	OUP,	260–290. -	(2011).	"On	a	Neglected	Epistemic	Virtue".	Philosophical Issues.	21(1): 165–218. -	(2014).	"The	Problem	with	the	Content	View".	Does Perception Have Content? Berit	Brogaard	(ed).	New	York:	OUP,	105–137. In	this	passage,	Byrne	conflates	two	critically	different	ideas.	First,	that "phenomenal	character	is	solely	a	matter	of	the	subject's	awareness	(or better, ostensible awareness) of his environment". Second, that phenomenal	character	is	fixed	simply	by	the	segment	of	reality	a	subject is	aware	of.	As	discussed	at	length,	the	first	claim	does	not	entail	the second.	The	Difference	Principle can	be rejected.	Once this is seen, the	epistemic	objection	to	the	idea	of	phenomenal	variation	despite an	unchanging	presented	scene	lapses.	For	whilst	understanding	such changes	in	terms	of	features	(splotches	of	mental	paint	or	sensation) which	"float	free"	from	reality	understandably	induces	epistemic	anxiety,	understanding	such	changes	in	terms	of	the	different	ways	reality can	present	itself	does	not.	It	is	quite	consistent	with	Smithies'	thought that	only	experience	with	the	phenomenal	character	of	confrontation can	have	epistemic	bearing. Three	potential	considerations	in	favor	of	the	Difference	Principle have	been	found	wanting.	Absent	stronger	arguments,	the	naïve	realist	should	feel	no	compunction	in	discarding	it.	So	unburdened,	the naïve	realist	is	freed	to	endorse	a	particularly	simple	account	of	both veridical	perception	and	illusion:	Simple,	Austere	Naïve	Realism. References Alston,	William	P.	(1999).	"Back	to	the	Theory	of	Appearing". Philosophical Perspectives 13:	181–203. Beck, Ori (2019). "Rethinking Naive Realism". Philosophical Studies 176(3):	607–633. Batty,	Clare	and	Macpherson,	Fiona	(2016).	"Redefining	Illusion	and Hallucination in Light of New Cases". Philosophical Issues 26(1): 263–296. Block,	Ned	(1996).	"Mental	Pain	and	Mental	Latex".	Philosophical Issues 7:	19–49. -	(1999).	"Sexism,	Racism,	Ageism,	and	the	Nature	of	Consciousness". Philosophical Topics	26(1):	39–70. -	(2010).	"Attention	and	Mental	Paint".	Philosophical Issues, 20:	23–63. Brewer,	Bill	(2011).	Perception and its Objects.	Oxford:	OUP. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) Phillips,	Ian	(2013).	"Hearing	and	Hallucinating	Silence".	Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology.	Fiona	Macpherson	and	Dimitris	Platchias	(eds).	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	333–360. Price,	Henry	Habberley	(1932).	Perception.	London:	Methuen	&	Co.	Ltd. Robinson,	Howard	(1994).	Perception.	London:	Routledge. Siegel,	Susanna	(2012).	The Contents of Visual Experience.	Oxford:	OUP. Smith,	Arthur	David (2010). "Disjunctivism	and Illusion".	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	80(2):	384–410. Smithies,	Declan	(2014).	"The	Phenomenal	Basis	of	Epistemic	Justification".	New Waves in Philosophy of Mind.	Mark	Sprevak	and	Jesper Kallestrup	(eds).	New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	98–124. Snowdon,	Paul	(1992).	"How	to	Interpret	'Direct	Perception'".	The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception.	Tim	Crane	(ed).	Cambridge: CUP,	48–78. Sorensen,	Roy (2008).	Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows. Oxford:	OUP. Soteriou,	Matthew	(2013).	The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.	Oxford:	OUP. -	(2016).	Disjunctivism.	London:	Routledge. Thau,	Michael	(2002).	Consciousness and Cognition. New	York:	OUP. Tye,	Michael	(1984). "The	Adverbial	Approach	to	Visual	Experience". The Philosophical Review	93(2):	195–225. -	(1995).	Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press. -	(2002). "Visual	Qualia	and	Visual	Content	Revisited".	Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. David Chalmers (ed). Oxford:	OUP,	447–456. Acknowledgements: We	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	this	journal	for	very	helpful	comments.	Versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	at	a	SPIN	workshop	at Durham	University,	the	London	Mind	Group	at	UCL,	a	BPPA	event	at Warwick	University,	the	RIP	seminar	series	at	the	University	of	Southampton,	the	University	of	Oslo,	the	University	of	Nottingham,	the	University	of	California,	Berkeley,	and	Birkbeck,	University	of	London.	We Kalderon,	Mark Eli (2008). "Metamerism, Constancy, and Knowing Which".	Mind	117(468):	549–585. -	(2011).	"Color	Illusion".	Noûs	45(4):	751–775. -	(2011b).	"The	Multiply	Qualitative"	Mind	120(478):	239–262. -	(2015).	Form without Matter: Empedocles and Aristotle on Color Perception.	Oxford:	OUP. Langsam,	Harold	(1997).	"The	Theory	of	Appearing	Defended". Philosophical Studies 87(1):	33−59. Logue,	Heather	(2012).	"Why	Naive	Realism?"	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society	112(2):	211–237. Martin,	Michael	(1997).	"The	Reality	of	Appearances".	Thought and Ontology.	Mark	Sainsbury	(ed).	Milan:	FrancoAngeli,	77−96. -	(1998).	"Setting	Things	Before	the	Mind".	Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind.	Anthony	O'Hear	(ed).	Cambridge:	CUP,	157–180. -	(2002). "The Transparency of Experience".	Mind & Language 17(4): 376–425. -	(2004). "The Limits of Self-Awareness". Philosophical Studies 120: 37–89. -	(2006). "On Being Alienated". Perceptual Experience. Tamar Szabo Gendler	and	John	Hawthorne	(eds).	Oxford:	OUP,	354–410. -	(2010). "What's in	a	Look?"	Perceiving the World.	Bence	Nanay (ed). Oxford:	OUP,	160–225. Moore,	George	Edward	(1953).	"Sense-data".	Some Main Problems of Philosophy.	London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	28–40. Morrison, John (2016). "Perceptual Confidence". Analytic Philosophy 57(1):	15–48. Munton,	Jessie	(2016).	"Visual	Confidences	and	Direct	Perceptual	Justification".	Philosophical Topics	44(2):	301–326. Pautz,	Adam	(2017).	"Experiences	are	Representations:	An	Empirical Argument".	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Bence Nanay	(ed).	New	York	and	London:	Routledge,	23–42. Peacocke, Christopher (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford:	OUP. craig	french	&	ian	phillips Austerity and Illusion philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	20,	no.	15	(may	2020) thank	audiences	on	those	occasions	for	their	many	helpful	questions and	comments.	For	valuable	discussions,	thanks	to:	Julian	Bacharach, Ori	Beck,	Bill	Brewer,	John	Campbell,	Anil	Gomes,	Nick	Jones,	Adam Pautz, Lauren Slater, Matthew Soteriou, Jonathan Tallant, and Lee Walters.	We	would	also like to record	a special	debt	of gratitude to Mike	Martin	without	whose	papers,	seminars,	and	conversation	over many	years	we	would	never	have	been	in	a	position	to	write	this	paper. Funding:	Craig	French	would	like	to	acknowledge	the	Leverhulme Trust for the Research Fellowship that supported his work on this article.